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NOTES AND COMMENTS

ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in September, 1950,
attempts to remedy the failure of existing legal techniques and the
inadequacy of concepts of personal jurisdiction and full faith and credit
to resolve the problem of deserted dependents in a federal system. A
simple two-state procedure is devised whereby the courts of each state
participate in enforcing, by appropriate civil and criminal remedies, the
duty of support owed by a person who has fled from one state to the
other, provided, of course, that both states have the same or substantially similar reciprocal law. 19
Subsequent to the principal case, this Act, with modifications, was
enacted into law by the North Carolina General Assembly.20 The adoption of this Act is an unequivocal legislative expression of the public
policy of this state to provide effective means of coping with the problems inherent in the interstate enforcement of support. Since reciprocity
is the heart of the act, its efficacy may be gauged by the number of states
that adopt it. Until its full potential is realized by widespread adoption,
the court should feel bound to give effect to the legislative declaration of
public policy by providing equitable, as well as legal, remedies for enforcing foreign alimony decrees and support orders, in those cases that
come before it from states which have yet to adopt a reciprocal or
similar law.
JOHN T. Mo~msEy.
Constitutional Law-Privilege Against Self-IncTiminationSmith Act
In the recent case of Blau v. UnitedStates,'
to a subpoena, appeared as a witness before the
Court Grand Jury at Denver, Colorado. There
questions 2 concerning the Communist Party of

petitioner, in response
United States District
she was asked several
Colorado and her em-

"9For a substantially similar act, progenitor of the principal act, see UNIFORM
SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS Acr, adopted by 10 jurisdictions in 1949. CONN. GEN.
STAT. tit. 63, c. 415a (Supp. 1949) ; ILL. Rv. STAT. c. 68, Sec. 50 (1949) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. sec. 38-118a (Bums 1949); IOWA CODE c. 252A (1950); M& LAws
c. 297 (1949) ; N. H. LAWS c. 153 (1949) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, c. 18, sec.
17.1 (Gum. Supp. 1950); McK. UNcONSOL. LAWS sec. 2111-2120 (1949); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, sec. 1601-1610 (Supp. 1949); VIRGIN ISLANDS, Bill No. 3 (1949).

Though bearing the title, "Uniform," this act was not promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. For an interesting account of the
genesis of this Act, see Griswold, "Fugitive Husbands," American Magazine,
Jan. 1949, p. 24.
2. See summary of new statute, supra p. 423.
171 Sup. Ct. 223 (1950).
-"Do you know the names of the State officers of the Communist Party of
Colorado?" "Do you know what the organization of the Communist Party of
Colorado is, the table of organization of the Communist Party of Colorado?"
"Were you ever employed by the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Did you ever
have in your possession or custody any of the books and records of the Communist
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ployment by it, all of which she refused to answer, asserting her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 3 The petitioner was
adjudged guilty of contempt. 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed,r0 stating
that membership in the Party is not of itself an offense, therefore
answers to the questions propounded would not subject petitioner to
criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court, by unanimous decision,0
reversed stating that the Smith Act 7 made further prosecution of petitioner far more than a mere imaginary possibility, and that she could
reasonably fear prosecution under it if she admitted employment by the
Communist Party or intimate knowledge of its working. Whether such
admissions by themselves would support a conviction under a criminal
statute was immaterial since they would have furnished a link in the
chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of petitioner for violation of
or conspiracy to violate,8 the Smith Act.
This decision resolves the conflict among lower federal courts as to
whether a witness may refuse to answer inquiries as to his affiliation
with or knowledge of the Communist Party on the ground of self-incrimination. 9 The Supreme Court, in the principal case, states that
"the attempt by the lower courts to compel petitioner to testify runs
counter to the Fifth Amendment as it has been interpreted' o from the
Party of Colorado?" "Did you turn the books and records of the Communist
Party of Colorado over to any particular person?" "Do you know the names of
any persons who might now have the books and records of the Communist Party
of Colorado?" "Could you describe to the grand jury any books and records of the
Communist
Party of Colorado ?"
3
U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. "No person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ."
'Petitioner asserted privilege before the grand jury and refused to answer,
whereupon she was taken before the District Judge who again propounded the
same questions, and petitioner again claimed privilege and refused to testify.
180 F. 2d 103 (10th Cir. 1950).
' Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
"18 U. S. C. §2385 (1948). "Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets,
advises, or teaches the duty, necessity ... of overthrowing ... the government of
the United States .. . ; or . . . whoever organizes or helps . . . to organize any
society . . . of persons who teach ... the overthrow . . of any such government

by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such
society, group . . . of persons, knowing the purposes thereof shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ......
s 18 U.S.C. §371 (1948). "If two or more persons conspire to commit any
offense against the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
*..or both."
9 Privilege overruled: Blau v. U. S., 180 F. 2d 103 (10th Cir. 1950); Rogers
v. U. S., 179 F. 2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950).
Privilege allowed: Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Estes v.
Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Kasinowitz v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 632 (9th
Cir. 1950); Doran v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. U. S.,
181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
"oFor an excellent historical discussion see Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incdinination, 34 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1949).
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beginning."
The privilege insures that a person, whether defendant or
witness, 12 shall not be compelled to give testimony which discloses a
fact that would form a necessary and essential part of a crime, or which
forms a link in the chain of testimony which would be sufficient to convict him of any crime. 13 For a witness to be entitled to the privilege,
the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of
the evidence which the witness is called to give,' 4 that there is reasonable
ground for the witness to apprehend danger of criminal prosecutionmere imaginary possibility of danger is not sufficient to justify use of the
privilege.' 5 Also, it must not be put forward for a sentimental reason,
or where witness has already received pardon for the crime, concerning
which he is interrogated, or where prosecution therefor is barred by
the statute of limitations.' 6 The privilege is essentially a personal one,
applying only to natural individuals'7 and it may not be invoked for the
protection of third persons,' 8 or by individuals standing in a representative capacity even though the testimony required may incriminate the
witness personally.19 It may be invoked in court proceedings as well as
before a federal grand jury20 or administrative agency, 21 and it must be
Sup. Ct. 223, at 224 (1950).
Raffel v. U. S., 271 U. S.494 (1926) ; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S.34
(1924); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1891).
3Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137 (1949) ; Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th
Cir. 1950) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Kasinowitz v. U. S.,
181 F. 2d 632 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Doran v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950) ;
Alexander v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950) ; U. S. v. Rosen, 174 F. 2d
187 (2id Cir. 1949); U. S. v. Wiseman, 111 F. 2d 260 (2nd Cir. 1940); U. S. v.
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14, 692e (C. C. D. Va.).
Witness is protected from being compelled to disclose the circumstances of his
offense, or the sources from which, or the means by which, evidence of its commission, or of his connection with it, may be obtained, or made effectual for his
conviction. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.547 (1891).
" U. S. v. Hoffman, 185 F. 2d 617 (3rd Cir. 1950) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d
865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Alexander v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950) ; U. S. v.
Rosen, 174 F. 2d 187 (2nd Cir. 1949) ; U. S. v. Wiseman, 111 F. 2d 260 (2nd Cir.
1171
1-

1940).

" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951) ; Mason v. U. S., 244 U. S. 362
(1916) ; Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950) ; U. S. v. Hoffman, 185
F. 2d
617 (3rd
Cir. 1950).
"0Brown
v. Walker,
161 U. S.591 (1896).
" U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944); Brown v. U. S., 276 U. S. 134
(1928) ; Essgee Co. of China v. U. S., 262 U. S.151 (1923) ; Grant v. U. S., 227
U. S.74 (1913) ; Wheeler v. U. S., 226 U. S.478 (1913) ; Wilson v. U. S., 211
U. S. 361 (1911).
" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951) ; U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S.141
(1931); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.
43 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.591 (1896).
"Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694
(1944); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.43
(1906); Healey v. U. S., 186 F. Zd 164 (9th Cir. 1950).
7"
U. S. v. Monia, 317 U. S.424 (1943) ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.
547 (1891); U. S. v. Hoffman, 185 F. 2d 617 (3rd Cir. 1950).
-Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137 (1949) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1950); U. S. v. DeLorenzo, 151 F. 2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1945).
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invoked specifically, 22 else it is waived 23 and thereupon the witness must
make full disclosure. 24 Also, it may not be asserted where the prose-

cution feared will be by another sovereign. 25 Immunity statutes may
abate the privilege, but to be valid, they must be as broad as the con20
stitutional privilege itself.
The decision of the principal case affords persons interrogated concerning their knowledge of, or connection with, the Communist Party,
its activities or members, a definite constitutional ground for refusal to
answer. In the past, such persons refused to answer on the grounds that
the questions asked violated the guarantees of the First Amendment;
or, where the investigation was being conducted by a congressional committee, the witness refused to answer, stating the committee was uncon-

stitutional since Congress has no power to make investigations into
private affairs 27 or legislate in re freedom of speech. But these defenses
were rejected in several cases, including those of the Hollywood Ten. 28

" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); U. S. v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424
(1943) ; McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; U. S. v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp.
538 (M.D. Pa. 1947) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVmENCE §2268 (3d ed. 1940).
' Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951) ; U. S. v. Gates, 176 F. 2d 78 (2nd
Cir. 1949) ; U. S. v. DeLorenzo, 151 F. 2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1945) ; U. S. v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1947). But cf. Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137
(1949) ; U. S.v.Murdock,284 U. S.141 (1931).
2 Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); Raffel v. U. S., 271 U. S. 494
(1926) ; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U. S. 355 (1922) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.
S. 591 (1896) ; U. S. v. Gates, 176 F. 2d 78 (2nd Cir. 1949); U. S. v. Johnson,
76 F. Supp. 538 (M. D. Pa. 1947.).
2 U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43
(1906).
" Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137 (1949) ; U. S. v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943);
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43
(1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U. S. 547 (1891). Oral offer of immunity by interrogator insufficient, Healey v.
U. 2S.,
186 F. 2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950).
7
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).

Notes, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 775

(1949) ; 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 464 (1949) ; 23 NOTRE DAMz LAW. 353 (1948).
2 Marshall v. U. S., 176 F.2d 473 (D. C. Cir. 1949); Lawson v. U. S.,
176 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1949); U. S. v. Dennis, 171 F. 2d 986 (D. C.
Cir. 1948); Eisler v. U. S., 170 F. 2d 273 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Barsky
v. U. S., 167 F. 2d 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 843 (1948);
U. S. v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 838
(1948), rehearing denied, 333 U. S. 858 (1948). Notes, 6 WAsu. & LEE L. REv.
66 (1949), 47 COL. L. REV. 416 (1947). But cf. 43 ILL L. Rv. 253 (1948). Statute
suggested by writer in 27 NED. L. R.Ev. 601 (1948).
Defenses in question were raised by above defendants being prosecuted for
violation of REv. STAT. §102 (1857), 2 U. S. C. §192 (1938), making it a misdemeanor to refuse to answer any question of a Congressional Committee pertinent to the inquiry. Violations are: refusal to produce subpoenaed records, U. S.
v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950). U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944) ; refusal to
appear, McGrainv. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1936), U. S. v. Dennis, siupra; refusal to answer, Lawson v. U. S., supra; refusal to be sworn, Eisler v.
U. S., supra, U. S. v. Josephson, supra. This statute applies to witnesses
who voluntarily appear as well as those summoned; also, in prosecution under
it, burden on government to show question was pertinent to matter under investigation, and issue of "pertinency" is for the court, and not the jury, Sinclair
v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1928). Questions in re finances and personnel of the
Communist organization are pertinent, Marshall v. U. S., 176 F. 2d 473 (D. C.
Cir. 1949).
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What will be the effect of this holding upon investigations of the
Communist Party? The present case makes it clear that a witness may
refuse to answer questions concerning his knowledge of or connection
with the Party because of their incriminating effect. The next problem
is, before what investigating panels may a witness invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination? He may do so before any federal grand jury
or federal judge as was done in the principal case. 29 May the privilege
be invoked before a congressional committee? In a recent oral decision,
Federal Judge T. Alan Goldsborough held that a witness before a Senate
investigating committee was within his constitutional rights in refusing
to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination, 30 and acquitted
the witness of contempt-of-Congress charges. The Judge stated, "The
court is of the opinion that if the defendant had answered all thirty-two
questions 8 ' in the affirmative-or in a certain way-it would have taken
very little more evidence to put him in the penitentiary." There is no
Supreme Court holding squarely on the point,3 2 but that court has held
that Congress may investigate subject only to the restraints imposed by
the Constitution.3 3 Lower federal courts have also so indicated, 34 as
well as writers on the problem.3 5 It is well to note that the Supreme
Court has held3 6 that the immunity granted by statute37 to witnesses
before congressional committees is insufficient to abate the constitutional
privilege, since the purpose of the immunity statute was effectively nullified in 1891 by Counselman v. Hitchcock.38
The result of the present ruling forces the investigating authorities
20 Cases cited note 20 supra.
N. Y. Times, March 22, 1951, p. 37, col. 4.
"' Defendant was asked questions concerning his connection with the defunct
subversive magazine "Amerasia"; his knowledge and association with other persons guilty of subversive activities.
"2Whether or not the privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed by a
witness before a Congressional Committee.
" U. S.v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950) ; Barry v. U. S. ex rel. Cunningham,
279 U. S. 597 (1928).
"4Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950) states that congressional
committees have the right to subpoena witnesses and ask questions, and it is the
duty of such witnesses to answer, but by n. 18 the Court recognizes that the witness25in the present case made no claim of privilege against self-incrimination.
Notes, 49 CoL L. REv. 87 (1949), 35 VA.L. RFv. 97 (1949).
0
U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950).
7 18 U. S. C. §3486 (1948). "No testimony given by a witness before . . .
any committee of either House . . . shall be used as evidence in any criminal
prosecution against him in any court. ..."
28 142 U. S. 547 (1891), which held REv. STAT. §860 [statute identical in all
material respects to REv. STAT. §859, 18 U. S. C. §3486 (1948)] was not sufficient
substitute for the Constitutional privilege. Thereafter REv. STAT. §860 was repealed
by Congress. "But," the Court in U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950) continues, "attention of Congress has not apparently been called to the anomaly
presented by the continued existence of REv. STAT. §859, which, like Rav. STAT.
§860, was a constituent part of immunity 'bargain' declared invalid in the Counselman case."
See 49 COL. L. Rav. 87 (1949).
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to search for independent evidence instead of relying upon proof extracted from individuals by force of law.8 9 This renders investigation
of the Communist Party exceedingly difficult, since it is so tightly
woven. It is 'doubted that the Internal Security Act of 195040 is of
sufficient protection to abate the assertion of the privilege since prosecution under the Smith Act 4 ' is the real danger and not membership in
the Communist Party.4 2 There is but one remaining hope for the in-

terrogators: that the witness will waive the privilege and, as a result, be
required to make a full disclosure of his knowledge of the Party. Such a
waiver is consummated when the witness answers any questions in regards to his knowledge of or affiliation with or membership in the Communist Party.4 3

Therefore, to avoid the dangers of a waiver and pre-

serve his privilege the witness must refuse to answer all questions concerning his association with the Party, as Patricia Blau did in the
principal case, or be held to have waived the privilege if any of such
questions are answered, as was done by Jane Rogers in the same
44
investigation.
WILLIAm E. GREEN.,
"Such independent evidence may not be obtained from the spouse of the witness interrogated, Blau v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 301 (1951). Petitioner in this
case is husband of petitioner in the principal case.
'064 STAT. 991, 50 U. S. C. A. §783f (Supp. 1950). "Neither the holding of
office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation . . . of any . . . criminal statute." The Supreme Court,
in Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951), expressed no opinion as to the implications of this legislation upon issues presented in that case, and discussed in
this note.
"'See note 7 up ra.
" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164
(9th Cir. 1950) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Doran v. U. S.,
181 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir.
1950).
"Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951). In this case, the petitioner, Jane
Rogers admitted she was treasurer of the Communist Party of Colorado;
also that she had possession of the books and records thereof up until January
1948, the investigation being held in September 1948, but she refused to answer
questions as to whom she had turned them over to, on the ground of self-incrimination. The Supreme Court held that she had waived the privilege, and
that the answer to the propounded question would subject her to no further danger
of prosecution than she was already subjected to because of previous admissions.
The dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Black, states that the majority opinion
too greatly expands the "waiver" doctrine and therefore the witness runs the risk
of refusing to answer prematurely and be in contempt, or answering and thereby
waiving the privilege against self-incrimination. Quaere: Could there be a premature refusal to answer under the decision of the principal case?
" Both Patricia Blau and Jane Rogers were subpoenaed and interrogated by
the Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
in September 1948. Both refused to answer and were found guilty of contempt
of court, and both appealed to the Supreme Court. Patricia Blau's case was
decided first, in December 1950.

